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EMPANELING THE PEERS OF POLLUTERS:
OBTAINING A JURY TRIAL UNDER THE OPA AND CERCLA
AS EXPLAINED IN
UNITED STA TES V. VIKING RESOURCES, INC.
ADDISON J. SCHRECK*
I. INTRODUCTION
The law concerning Seventh Amendment rights to a jury trial in
statutory environmental damage cases appears to be at a turning point; the
district court's decision in United States v. Viking Resources, Inc.
(hereinafter "Viking Resources") is at the forefront of this change. Faced
with an "avalanche"' of opposing authority, the court in Viking Resources
meticulously gathered minority decisions and treatise material in a
remarkably persuasive and insightful manner. In addressing this issue of
first impression, the court departed from precedent and granted the
Defendants' request for a jury trial.2
II. BACKGROUND
The Viking Resources case was brought by the United States
Government under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (hereinafter the "OPA"), 3
which was enacted primarily in response to the Exxon Valdez disaster.4
The OPA improved the government's ability to respond to, and prevent, oil
spills5 and also established liability for oil spill incidents.6
The court's opinion is replete with references to the similarities
between the OPA and the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (hereinafter "CERCLA").7
* Articles Editor, KENTUCKY JOURNAL OF EQUINE, AGRICULTURE, & NATURAL RESOURCES
LAw, 2010-2011. B.A. 2004, University of Georgia, J.D. expected May 2011, University of Kentucky
College of Law. The author would like to thank University of Kentucky College of Law Professors
Michael P. Healy and Robert G. Lawson for the contribution of their practical expertise.
' United States v. Viking Res., Inc., 607 F. Supp. 2d 808, 830 (S.D. Tex. 2009).
2 Id. at 832. The court also articulated holdings on statutory interpretation and preemption
issues; these will be given light coverage within this Comment, which is appropriate given their status as
additional support for established law.
3 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-62 (West, Westlaw through Feb. 16, 2010).
4 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Oil Pollution Act Overview,
http://www.epa.gov/emergencies/content/lawsregs/opaover.htrn (last visited Jan. 28, 2010).
5 Id.
6 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702(a)-(b) (West, Westlaw through Feb. 16, 2010).
' 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-75 (West, Westlaw through Feb. 16, 2010). CERCLA's enactment
was spurred in part by the Valley of the Drums site in Bullitt County, Kentucky. James Bruggers, Toxic
Legacy Revisited: Valley of the Drums, 30 Years Later, THE COURIER-JOURNAL, Dec. 14, 2008,
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Though decidedly larger in scope than the OPA, CERCLA's modus
operandi is strikingly similar.8 CERCLA, like the OPA, provides the
government with the authority to identify responsible parties for hazardous
waste sites and to compel them to reimburse the government for its efforts
to rectify the disaster.9 Though extraordinarily similar in form, the scope of
each act is mutually exclusive since CERCLA contains a petrochemical
exclusion, while the OPA applies only to petrochemicals."'
A. Facts
In December of 2004, an oil spill now known as the Highland
Bayou Spill occurred in the wetlands outside Galveston, Texas, on a tract of
land known as the Maco Stewart Lease. The spill originated from a tank
battery" whose ownership was disputed in Viking Resources.1 2 Over the
course of two months, the Coast Guard, the Texas General Land Office, the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the Environmental
Protection Agency, and the Texas Railroad Commission, extracted
approximately 225 barrels of oil from the surrounding area.' 3 Four years
after the Highland Bayou spill, federal litigation ensued concerning
reimbursement of $650,000 in damages.' 4  Viking Resources, Inc.
(hereinafter "Viking") was the most recent lessee of the facility.' 5 Viking's
president, sole owner, officer, and director, was Roger W. Chambers, and
both Viking and Chambers were named as Defendants in Viking
Resources.16
B. Procedure
In the subject action, the Government averred under the OPA that
Viking and/or Chambers were responsible for the tank battery and therefore
strictly liable for the damages resulting from the Highland Bayou Spill.
17
http://www.courier-
joumal.com/article/20081214/NEWSO1/81214001 &referrer-FRONTPAGECAROUSEL.
8 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, CERCLA Overview,
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/policy/cercla.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2010).
9 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a) (West, Westlaw through Feb. 16, 2010); 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702(a)
(West, Westlaw through Feb. 16, 2010).
10 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702(a) (West, Westlaw through Feb. 16, 2010); 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(14)(F)
(West, Westlaw through Feb. 16, 2010).
1 "A tank battery is a grouping of containers used to store liquids" such as oil. Viking Res.
Inc., 607 F. Supp. 2d at 813 n.6.
12 Id. at 812-13, 818.
"I d. at 813.
14 Id. at 812-14. The damages have been, or will be, paid out of the Oil Spill Liability Trust
Fund created by 26 U.S.C.A. § 9509 (West, Westlaw through Feb. 16, 2010). Id. at 813-14.
" Id. at 814.
'
6 1d
" Viking Res., Inc., 607 F. Supp. 2d at 814.
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The parties cross-motioned for summary judgment on the issue of liability,
which was primarily contingent on determining the responsible party for the
tank battery.' 8  Viking claimed a right to a jury trial as well as the
"affirmative defenses of release, collateral estoppel, and/or res judicata" as
a result of an earlier Texas state action. 19
Il. SUBSTANTIVE HOLDINGS OF THE COURT
The parties filed multiple summary judgment motions regarding the
assignment of liability under the OPA, which were addressed at length by
the court. In brief, the Defendants disavowed ownership of the tank
battery20 and the Government sought a broader interpretation of the term
"onshore facility" under the OPA.2' The Government also asserted that
Viking's corporate veil should be pierced so that Roger Chambers could be
held derivatively responsible for the Highland Bayou Spill.
22
The court utilized multiple sources of law in resolving the
aforementioned issues. Citing ambiguity in the OPA's definition of
"owner," the court turned to state contract law to determine the issue of
ownership.23 In addressing the possibility of Roger Chambers' derivative
responsibility, the court looked to CERCLA precedent.24 After lengthy
s Id. at 815-16.
'9 Id. at 825-28.
20 Id at 818.
21 The OPA states that to be responsible for an onshore facility a party must have owned or
operated the facility itself, in this case the tank battery. 33 U.S.C.A. § 2701(32)(B) (West, Westlaw
through Feb. 16, 2010). The Government, however, argued that the term should be interpreted broadly
to include the surrounding area. Viking Res., Inc., 607 F. Supp. 2d at 817. This is a substantially lower
burden, since the ownership of the tank battery is in dispute, whereas the ownership of the Maco Stewart
lease is not. The court rejected the Government's broad definition, stating that it would undermine
Congress's clear intent to make "ownership and operation the touchstones of liability for onshore
facilities," instead of loose spatial relationships. Id..
22 Viking Res., Inc., 607 F. Supp. 2d at 822.
23 Id. at 819-21. The court found that the tank battery was conveyed to Viking as an entity,
and not to Roger Chambers as an individual. Id. However, a question of material fact still existed
because this finding was countered with evidence from Chambers. Id. at 824.
24 Id. at 822 n.46. The court noted that piercing the corporate veil under the OPA can be
done for "all the same reasons" as under CERCLA; this observation along with several others like it,
was nestled amongst numerous citations to CERCLA cases which markedly predominated the scant
citation to OPA cases. Id.
In keeping with CERCLA precedent, the court used the fifth circuit's United States v. Jon-T
Chems. factor test for finding reason to pierce via an alter ego theory, which enumerates various factors
to be examined when conducting an alter ego analysis. Id. at 823 (citing United States v. Jon-T
Chemicals, Inc., 768 F.2d 686 (5th Cir. 1985)). In application of the Jon-T test, the court considered
Chambers's sizable control and ownership of Viking, the undercapitalization of the entity, and the lack
of formality in corporate affairs and the commingling of Chambers's personal affairs with those of the
company. Viking Res., Inc., 607 F. Supp. 2d at 824. The Jon-T precedent should be taken with caution
since "[t]here is significant disagreement among courts and commentators over whether, in enforcing
CERCLA's indirect liability, courts should borrow state law, or instead apply a federal common law of
veil piercing." United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 63 n.9 (1998); Viking Res., Inc., 607 F. Supp. 2d
at 823 n.48.
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analysis the court found that there was insufficient evidence provided on
each of the issues to warrant granting the summary judgments requested.25
IV. PROCEDURAL HOLDINGS OF THE COURT
Viking requested a jury trial in its original answer and the
Government subsequently filed a Motion to Strike Jury Demand.26
A. Right to a Jury Trial
The determination of a right to a jury trial for removal cost
damages as well as natural resource damages under the OPA had never
been considered by any federal court.27 The court began with reference to
the black letter law:
A party in a civil case has a right to a trial by jury only if an
applicable statute so provides or the Seventh Amendment
to the United States Constitution applies and guarantees the
right in the particular case.28 Because "the OPA does not
create a statutory right to a trial by jury," Viking and
Chambers are entitled to a jury trial only if the Seventh
Amendment's limited right to trial by jury applies in this
case.
29
The United States Supreme Court held that the Seventh
Amendment not only preserves the right to a jury trial as it existed in 1791
but also applies to statutory claims if legal rights and remedies are created
and claimed.30  The well settled two-factor test for determining the
existence of the aforementioned legal rights and remedies is found in the
pivotal case of Tull v. United States.31 It should be noted that either of the
Tull factors can trigger a right to a jury trial.32 First, under Tull, the statutory
cause of action must be paired with its 1791 counterpart, and a
25 Viking Res., Inc., 607 F. Supp. 2d at 814-24.
26 Id. at 828.
21 Id. at 829, 831.
28 Id. at 828 (citing Morgan v. Ameritech, 26 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1090 (C.D. I11. 1998); FED R.
Civ. P. 38(a)).29 Id. at 828 (quoting S. Port Marine, LLC v. Gulf Oil, LP, 234 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 2000)).
30 Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193-94 (1974); U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
31 Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987). It is worth noting that Tull itself was an
environmental law case, dealing with civil penalties for dumping in wetlands under the Clean Water
Act. Id.
32 See id. at 421 n.6 (The Court rejected the Government's contention "that both the cause of
action and the remedy must be legal in nature before the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial
attaches," saying that it is searching for a "single historical analog" and that the nature of the cause of
action and the remedy are simply "two important factors" in this search).
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determination must be made as to whether it would have been brought in a
court of law or equity. Second, and more importantly, according to Tull
the remedy sought must be classified either as legal damages, which
warrant a trial by jury, or equitable damages, which can be determined in
the absence of ajury.34
In Viking Resources, the second factor analysis is complicated
because two separate remedies are sought: removal costs 35 and natural
resource damages; 36 therefore, the possibility exists that one will be deemed
equitable and the other legal.37 When equitable issues are interspersed with
legal ones, every effort must be taken to preserve a jury trial.38 The court
focused primarily on the second factor of Tull and whether or not the
damages themselves were legal or equitable. 39  The court used the first
factor of Tull, whether the 1791 action would have been tried in a court of
equity or a court of law, to supplement its primary discussion but gave it
little coverage overall.4°
1. Removal Costs
In determining the existence of a right to a jury trial for removal
costs under the OPA, the court in Viking Resources elegantly walked the
fine line between ruling in accordance with established law and recognizing
an upcoming change in precedent. Since no court had addressed the issue
under the OPA, the court again noted the similarities between the OPA and
CERCLA and turned to CERCLA cases containing a removal costs claim. 41
The body of CERCLA precedent is unanimous in finding that removal costs
are a form of restitution and therefore equitable.42 In accordance with this
33 Id. at 417 (citing Penell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 378 (1974); Dairy Queen, Inc.
v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469,477 (1962)).
3 Id. at 417-18 (citing Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974); Ross v. Bernhard, 396
U.S. 531, 542 (1970)).
3' 33 U.S.C.A. § 2701(31) (West, Westlaw through Feb. 16, 2010). One must consider "the
costs of removal that are incurred after a discharge of oil has occurred or, in any case in which there is a
substantial threat of a discharge of oil, the costs to prevent, minimize, or mitigate oil pollution from such
an incident." Id.
36 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702(b)(2)(A) (West, Westlaw through Feb. 16, 2010) (defining natural
resource damages as "[d]amages for injury to, destruction of, loss of, or loss of the use of, natural
resources, including reasonable costs ofiassessing the damage."); see also 33 U.S.C.A. § 2701(20)
(West, Westlaw through Feb. 16, 2010) (defining natural resources as "land, fish, wildlife, biota, air,
water, ground water, drinking water supplies ... controlled by the United States .... any State or local
government or Indian tribe, or any foreign government").
37 Viking Res.. Inc., 607 F. Supp. 2d at 828-29.
38 Id. at 829 (quoting United States v. Williams, 441 F.2d 637, 644 (5th Cir. 1971))
(explaining that though the discretion of the court to deny trial by jury would be retained, it would be
drastically narrowed).
'9 See id. at 828-29.
40 See id. at 828-33.
41 Id. at 830.4 2 Id. at 829.
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"avalanche of authority" and giving due deference to the doctrine of stare
decisis, the court held that removal costs are equitable and do not warrant a
ight to a jury trial.43
However, in an incredibly insightful, albeit brief, passage of dicta,
the court asserts that the "conventional wisdom" on the subject is
inconclusive. 44 Within this passage the court cites three compelling pieces
of authority: Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson,45
United States v. Sunoco, Inc.,46 and Dan B. Dobbs' LAW OF REMEDIES.4 7
The courts in Knudson and Sunoco each drew heavily from Dobbs.
In Knudson, the United States Supreme Court articulated the
distinction between equitable restitution and legal restitution. According to
the Court, the characterization of the damages is dependent on the
underlying claim, with ownership of the subject property being integral.48
"In cases in which the plaintiff 'could not assert title or right to possession
of particular property, but in which nevertheless he might be able to show
just grounds for recovering money to pay for some benefit the defendant
had received from him,' the plaintiff had a right to restitution at law
through an action derived from the common law writ of assumpsit. ' '49 The
facts of Viking Resources tend to satisfy these characteristics. The
Government had no right to the property. Also, as the owners of the Maco
Stewart lease, Viking and Chambers received a service from the
government for which they should pay; support for this contention is found
in the OPA itself which provides the theory of liability on which the
Government's claim was based.5°
In Sunoco, Judge Brody made the interesting argument that courts
which have held removal costs to be presumptively equitable, assumed this
outcome "simply because [they] involved restitution."5' Brody concluded
that damages such as the ones in Viking Resources, which are based on
unjust enrichment, are actually more similar to a "contract implied in
law., 52 The purpose of contracts implied in law, which were developed in
English law courts as a form of assumpsit,53 was "to prevent unjust
enrichment of the defendant when 'in equity and good conscience,' he
41 Viking Res., Inc., 607 F. Supp. 2d at 830.
SId. at 830 n.79.
41 Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
4 United States v. Sunoco, Inc., 501 F Supp. 2d 641 (E.D.Pa. 2007).
41 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES (2d ed. 1993).
" Knudson, 534 U.S. at 212.
49 Id. at 213 (quoting DOBBS, supra note 48, at § 4.2(1)).
'o 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702(a) (West, Westlaw through Feb. 16,2010).
5' Sunoco, 501 F Supp. 2d at 652, 652 n.14 (citing Knudson, 534 U.S. at 204).52 Id. at 649 (citing DOBBS, supra note 48, at §§ 4.2(3), 5.2(5)).
53 Viking Res. Inc., 607 F. Supp. 2d at 830 n.79 (citing DOBBS, supra note 48, at § 4.2(3)).
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should not be permitted to keep gains he had received. 54
The Viking Resources court also noted that response costs under
CERCLA are analogous to repair costs because a private property owner
might recover, and therefore resemble, other types of common law
damages. 55 In light of the aforementioned authority, the Viking Resources
court asserted that the courts in the previous CERCLA cases may have
neglected to consider 'the fine distinction between restitution at law and
restitution at equity,',, 56 and that the nature of removal costs is "open to
question.,
57
2. Natural Resource Damages
Echoing its discussion of removal costs, the court looked to
CERCLA litigation for instruction on the issue of natural resource
damages.58 One such decision, United States v. Wade, summarily held that
natural resource damages were equitable in nature because such damages
"were 'in the nature of restitution.' ' 59  Once again it appeared that the
courts adjudicating CERCLA cases viewed the restitutionary nature of
damages as absolute proof that they are equitable in nature. However, the
Viking Resources court recognized that stare decisis presented no bar on
holding that natural resource damages were legal in nature, almost
immediately drawing attention to yet another CERCLA case, In re
Acushnet River.
In Acushnet, the court held that the diminution of value aspect of
natural resource damages was legal in nature because natural resource
damages are equivalent to tort damages under trespass theory.60 Damages
of this sort would be litigated in a court of law.6 ' However, the holding in
Acushnet is not as broad as it may appear. The court in Acushnet refused to
consider restoration and replacement costs as natural resource damages,
instead classifying them as removal costs. 62  This narrow definition of
natural resource damages, therefore, only includes damages for resources
that are "'forever lost' and for the costs of assessing those damages.63
Having determined that at least one facet of the natural resource
54 DOBBS, supra note 48, at § 4.2(3), § 4.2(3) n.1 (noting that "[t]he reference to 'equity and
good conscience' refers to a standard of judgment, not to equity jurisdiction. These cases are
indisputably 'law' cases.") (citing Philpott v. Superior Court, 36 P.2d 635, 637 (Cal. 1934)).
55 Viking Res., Inc., 607 F. Supp. 2d at 830 n.79 (citing DOBBS, supra note 48, § 5.2(5)).
56 Id. at 829 n.76 (quoting Knudson, 534 U.S. at 214 (2002)).
'7 Id. at 830 n.79.
5 Id. at 831.
591d. (quoting United States v. Wade, 653 F. Supp. 11, 13 (E.D. Pa. 1984)).
601d. at 832 (citing In re Acushnet River, 712 F. Supp. 994, 999-1001 (D. Mass. 1989)).
61 In re Acushnet River, 712 F. Supp. 994, 1000 (D. Mass. 1989) (citations omitted).
62 Viking Res. Inc., 607 F. Supp. 2d at 831 (citing In re Acushnet River, 712 F. Supp. at 999).
63Id. at 831-32 (quoting In re Acushnet River, 712 F. Supp. at 999).
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damages is legal, the Viking Resources court was quick to note that "Viking
and Chambers' Seventh Amendment rit to a jury trial is triggered by this
one legal component of the remedy." In addition, the elements of strict
liability under the OPA must be satisfied before the Government can pursue
damages, including the natural resource damages; therefore, the court held
that these issues were "legal in nature such that they must be tried to the
jury, even if they are also relevant to equitable components of the
remedy."
65
B. Bifurcation
Turning to Viking's Motion to Bifurcate, the court opined that
since the legal issues within the natural resources damages matter must be
tried before a jury, judicial efficiency would dictate that the entire trial be
conducted before a jury.66 Even though Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
42(b) gives a court the discretion to order separate trials, this discretion is
meant to promote judicial efficiency, and the court found that no such
purpose existed here.67
The court's reasoning is well grounded but difficult to follow.
When Viking and Chambers requested bifurcation, their intention and hope
was that there would be one trial for the liability issues, and another for the
68damages issues. However, the liability issues are prerequisites to reaching
the legal issue of natural resource damages, and, therefore, they must also
be decided by a jury. This means that the two trials Viking requested
would both include issues that must be tried before a jury; therefore, the
parties essentially requested two jury trials, which would be a clear misuse
of judicial resources. 69
C. Preemption
Viking and Chambers asserted the "affirmative defenses of release,
collateral estoppel, and/or res judicata."7 °  Their argument was that a
previous state action, regarding an order to cap certain oil wells, was
preemptory to the federal action at bar.7'
Since all preemption defenses are based on common assertions, the
4Id. at 832.
65 id
6Id. The court noted that the jury verdict on the equitable issues will be advisory. This is in
the interest of'judicial efficiency since the parties will only be required to present evidence once, and if
one of the equitable issues is later deemed to be legal, a retrial will not be necessary. Id. at 832 n.82.
67 Id. at 833 (citing FED. R. CIv. P. 42(b)).
68 Viking Res., Inc., 607 F. Supp. 2d at 833.691id
70 Id. at 825.
" Id. at 826-27.
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court used the same fact findings to dismiss each of the preemption
defenses.72 First, the court starkly distinguished the Texas state government
from the federal government, stating that the United States was clearly not a
party to the state court action." Second, the court noted that the two issues,
(1) the order to cap certain oil wells and (2) the damages from the Highland
Bayou spill, involved similar practices in the same geographical area but
involved systemically different issues.74
V. IMPLICATIONS
The Viking Resources court's holding that natural resource
damages are legal in nature is pivotal. However, the court's dicta on the
legal nature of removal costs is extraordinarily persuasive and seems nearly
prophetic of the developments that are soon to come. Given this dicta and
the court's citation to the Supreme Court precedent of Knudson, it seems
clear that the restitutionary nature of removal costs will soon cease to be
enough to support a presumption that they are also equitable in nature. This
presumption, that all restitutionary damages are equitable in nature, seems
to have always been premature. From time immemorial some restitution
damages were decided by English courts of equity and some in English
courts of law.75
The court's frequent references to the similarities between
CERCLA and the OPA portends an extension of the court's Seventh
Amendment precedent to CERCLA cases. Countless courts have
recognized that the two acts are nearly identical in structure with the only
noticeable difference being that their scope is mutually exclusive because of
CERCLA's petrochemical exclusion.76 Therefore, just as the Viking
Resources court so readily turned to CERCLA precedent to determine an
issue under the OPA, so can future courts turn to Viking Resources, a case
decided under the OPA, for guidance in determining issues under
CERCLA. Thus Viking Resources is given precedential weight in
adjudications concerning both CERCLA and the OPA.
72 See id.
73 Id. The court was particularly dismissive of the contention when it said simply "[t]he
United States was not a party to the state court action" and with respect to the res judicata and collateral
estoppel defenses. Id.
74 Viking Res., Inc., 607 F. Supp. 2d at 826-27. The author of this Comment would like to
note that if Viking contends that an action concerning another part of the facility (the oil wells which the
state ordered be capped) is related to the tank battery spill, perhaps they should not have treated the
Government's broad definition of "onshore facility" so indignantly. This argument by the Defendants
betrays their own opinion of the Maco Stewart lease as a cohesive facility.
75 Sunoco, 501 F Supp. 2d at 652 n.14 (citing Knudson, 534 U.S. at 212); see also DOBBS,
supra note 48, § 4.2(1)).76 See supra notes 11, 42.
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Counsel on either side of a statutory environmental damages case
would do well to remember that either party may request a jury trial7 7 and
that such a request is not likely to benefit corporations. Information on the
subject of jury bias in corporate cases is often said to be inconclusive;
however, there is significant research indicating that juries treat corporate
defendants differently and sometimes less favorably than individual
defendants.78 In a 1998 survey co-sponsored by the National Law Review,
approximately 75% of the respondents said they felt that corporations
undertook surreptitious means to conceal the harm that they did.79 In
another poll, a similar percentage of respondents said that corporations had
obtained too much power in the United States.80 Due to their extensive
internal structure, expertise in their field, and deep pockets, corporations are
often presumed to have insights into the risks they take, and, because of this
presumption of foreknowledge, they are also thought to have heightened
culpability.8'
The citizenry is obviously concerned with the amount of power
corporate entities possess and whether or not they wield it in a benevolent
manner. When a case concerning something as fundamental and visible as
the local ecosystem arises, the possibility for jury bias is particularly high.82
The government and the corporations they prosecute will
increasingly find their matters tried before juries and, therefore, to a great
extent in the court of public opinion. A party's ability to use this fact to
their advantage, and to avoid its pitfalls, is more important now than ever.
VI. CONCLUSION
The holdings in Viking Resources regarding statutory interpretation
and preemption are overshadowed by the court's dynamic decisions on the
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. Either party can move for a jury
trial, 3 and with this court's holdings as precedent coupled with Supreme
Court precedent, 84 the motion will be difficult to deny. In the same vein,
motions to bifurcate will likely be unsuccessful. United States v. Viking
Resources Inc. is positioned at the forefront, in time and in the abstract, of a
"FED. R. CIv. P. 38(b).
78 Valerie P. Hans, The Illusions and Realities of Jurors' Treatment of Corporate
Defendants, 48 DEPAUL L. REv. 327, 352 (1998).
79 Peter Aronson et al., Jurors: A Biased, Independent Lot, NATL L.J., Nov.2, 1998, at AIL
so Hans, supra note 79, at 332 (citing The Public is Willing to Take Business On, Bus. WK.,
May 29, 1989, at 29).
"' Id. at 335-36.
8 There does exist some argument that this effect could be offset if the local community and
economy are dependent upon the corporation for employment and general prosperity; however, this
sympathetic element may be removed to an extent by way of objections during jury selection.
3 FED. R. Civ. P. 38(b).
" Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002); Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974); Ross v.
Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
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change in the common law that will have dramatic effects on environmental
law in the United States.

